Wednesday, November 4, 2026

PUBLIC POWER, PUBLIC CHOICE: A Manifesto for Constitutional Reform

Public Power, Public Choice

If You Don't Vote Blue in Massachusetts, This Is Your Welcome Packet


Congratulations. You have discovered the secret of Massachusetts politics: in most of your races, the election is over before you arrive. It ended sometime between the filing deadline in May and the moment the Secretary of the Commonwealth sent the ballots to the printer. The Commonwealth still provides the full experience. You go to the church basement or the town hall gym, accept a ballot from a volunteer with a highlighter, and find one name beside an empty line marked write-in, which works about as well as the suggestion box at the Registry of Motor Vehicles. You fill in the oval, feed the machine, collect the sticker, and go home. All the equipment of self-government is present. What is missing is the choice.

This is not a mood brought on by fluorescent lighting. When the candidate list came out in May, voters were on track to choose between listed candidates in just 82 of the Legislature's 200 contests. Twenty-five senators and 91 representatives faced no one on either the primary or the general ballot, and two House newcomers were set to stroll into open seats alone. Take it or take it. The nominal opposition was not exactly storming the building: Republicans ran candidates in 11 of 40 Senate districts and 46 of 160 House districts, so even a perfect night would have left Democrats holding at least 113 House seats and 29 Senate seats. The party's chair explained the selective recruiting by citing limited resources and a heavily gerrymandered state, a strategy somewhere between choosing your battles and announcing that the other team may keep the field. One senator had run unopposed in both primary and general every cycle since at least 2012.

The incumbent will win. If the incumbent is retiring, the incumbent's preferred successor will win. If both of them get hit by a bus, the party will produce another one who looks and votes very much like them, and that person will win too. You can knock on doors, write checks, and scream into the void about taxes, housing, schools, or whichever flavor of dysfunction is currently on fire, but when there is no second name on the ballot, none of it gives you anyone to vote for. The local paper's "longtime public servant seeks another term" story arrives with all the suspense of a tide chart. Your vote has not been suppressed. It has been rendered decorative. You are not so much a voter as a witness, the ballot is a receipt, and the sticker might as well say I Was There.

This is not a conspiracy, and nobody gathered in a candlelit room to abolish elections. It is what happens when one party becomes dominant enough that challengers decide the odds are hopeless, the other party spends its money elsewhere, and voters learn to expect no contest until the absence of competition passes for consent. The real election moves upstream into a September primary most people skip, and the general election becomes a formality. Where a serious primary happens, it can offer a real choice, but a win settled by a sliver of the electorate is no excuse for treating November as a confirmation hearing. Where there is no primary challenger either, even that defense is gone. The machinery turns, the ballots are counted, the victory speeches are delivered, and everyone pretends this is self-government.

Here is the part that ought to trouble Democrats too. A one-name ballot is a poor reward for belonging to the winning party. A Democratic voter who wants a different Democrat, a more independent legislator, or someone willing to stand up to leadership deserves more than the assurance that at least the Republican lost, especially when no Republican ran. Nor is the disease confined to one color: nine Republican representatives and one independent also drew no opposition at all. Give any party the same protection from challenge anywhere else and the principle is unchanged. A fair system is not one that reliably produces your preferred winner. It is one in which your preferred winner can be questioned, challenged, and replaced.

What follows is a proposal for what to do once you notice the election has stopped being an election. It is not a plan to turn Massachusetts red, and it is not a demand that voters elect people they don't support to improve the scenery. It is a plan to make it possible for the outcome to be something other than what the dominant organization has already decided: to open candidacy, broaden representation, expose the machinery of influence, and keep a practical route to replacement. If that sounds modest, you have not been paying attention to how the current system works. Read it, argue with it, and apply it to the people you support as readily as the people you oppose. And if the prospect of a fair contest makes a winning organization nervous, ask what, exactly, it has grown used to winning without.

The Manifesto in Brief

Public Power, Public Choice is a constitutional reform manifesto written in response to elections that have become formalities. In places like Massachusetts, the machinery of voting still runs, but the outcome is usually settled long before anyone casts a general-election ballot. One party dominates so thoroughly that challengers stop running and the real decision moves upstream, while everyone else takes part in a process whose result is already known. The manifesto's answer is contestability: the public must remain able to see the rules, challenge the people in power, and replace them. No party, movement, or officeholder may turn a win into permanent ownership of the institutions that will govern the next contest. The rules are meant to stay fair even when the people who wrote them lose.

It opens with a commitment to intellectual honesty. Its authors promise to test their own mechanisms rather than defend them out of pride, and to set apart any proposal that conflicts with their principles. Public office is treated as a temporary trust, not a possession, and every adult citizen gets a uniform vote for every office. Candidates reach the ballot on equal terms; parties can endorse but cannot act as gatekeepers. Legislatures would be elected by single transferable vote in multi-member districts, a method Cambridge has used since 1941, so that substantial minorities can actually elect someone. For Massachusetts the starting design is a 160-member House in 32 five-member districts and a 40-member Senate in eight five-member districts. Districts must follow documented communities, never party data or the addresses of incumbents.

Authority is staggered and divided among independently elected officers, so that no single election hands everything to one organization, though parties are never assigned their turns. Majorities can still govern. Committee power follows the election, negotiations and votes are public, and essential services keep running through budget fights. Money is disclosed in real time, and small-donor matching is open to independents. The bodies that draw maps and run elections have multiple appointment routes, published selection criteria, removal only by a two-thirds vote, and funding set by formula, so the people they oversee cannot capture them. Counting rules are fixed in advance, vacancies are filled by countback with safeguards against party-switching, and emergency powers expire.

The same principles apply from town boards to Congress, scaled to the size of the electorate. They leave town meetings alone and do not pretend the Senate's equal representation of states can be wished away. The system is built to be reviewed and corrected after adoption, and amended only by the people. An appendix presents age-matched federal voting as a separate idea that conflicts with the manifesto's own uniform franchise, and it states the arguments on both sides.

The core claim is simple: elections should remain contests, not ceremonies.

A Manifesto for Constitutional Reform

Government belongs to the public. It does not belong to political parties, entrenched officeholders, donor networks, or the organizations that have learned how to capture the machinery of nomination, districting, and oversight and treat public authority as their permanent possession. Elections must offer a genuine opportunity to choose, challenge, and replace. When they do not, the form of elections continues while the substance of self-government disappears, and the vote becomes a ceremony confirming outcomes that the rules of competition have already made nearly inevitable.

We call for a constitutional order built around contestability: the continuing ability of citizens to question authority, organize alternatives, compete for office, examine public decisions, and replace those entrusted with power. Our governing principle is simple.

No movement, party, or officeholder may convert electoral success into privileged control over the rules of competition, the administration of elections, public oversight, or the ability of voters to replace it.

This principle protects winners as well as challengers. A movement may earn repeated public support; it may not turn that support into a right to govern without meaningful challenge. We seek neither permanent Republican government nor permanent Democratic government, and no state, district, or office rightfully belongs to a political organization. Our purpose is not to guarantee a preferred outcome but to establish institutions that remain fair, functional, and accountable when people we oppose are elected. The principles that follow apply at every scale of government, from the town to the nation, with each mechanism sized to the electorate it serves.

I. Truth and Justice Come Before Attachment

Constitutional reform must begin with a willingness to revise its own assumptions. An idea does not deserve adoption because it was our first idea, because it expresses our frustration, or because it would disadvantage our opponents. It deserves adoption when its justification survives honest examination and its operation respects the people subject to it. We distinguish evidence from expectation, principles from predictions, and public benefit from partisan advantage. We will not claim that a mechanism has solved a problem before it has been tested, and we will not defend a failed proposal merely to stay consistent with our past positions. Where we hold a proposal that sits in tension with our own principles, we say so openly and set it apart for separate judgment rather than burying it in the core. Our loyalty is to self-government, not to the pride of its designers.

II. Contestability Is the First Principle

Victory confers authority for a term. It does not confer ownership of the institutions that will govern the next contest. Parties may organize, endorse, raise funds, and campaign, but they may not hold exclusive legal rights to nomination, ballot access, legislative organization, or the supervision of elections. The public must be able to see who is funding whom and who is coordinating with whom, and election administration must be structured so that no single office or faction can capture it. Every mechanism in this manifesto is measured against one question: does it keep the public able to see the rules, contest the office, and replace the holder?

III. Public Office Is a Temporary Trust

No officeholder acquires a permanent claim to authority through seniority, familiarity, party loyalty, or institutional connections, and no organization earns the right to govern indefinitely because it governed yesterday. Public employment, official communications, administrative discretion, and access to public information must serve public purposes; they must not become instruments for suppressing challengers or protecting incumbents. Those who govern must remain answerable to those they govern.

IV. The Franchise Belongs to Adult Citizens

The vote is the instrument by which the public replaces those who govern it. Every adult citizen has an equal opportunity to vote in the elections of every jurisdiction in which they are resident, and eligibility is determined solely by the constitutional standards of age, citizenship, and residency. No state, locality, or administrative body may add further qualifications or subtract existing ones, and the public's right to replace its government must never depend on wealth, educational credentials, political belief, or an official's judgment of personal worthiness.

Registration is available continuously, correction procedures are clear, and proof of eligibility is simple, documentary, and free of charge. Provisional ballots are counted if eligibility is later confirmed, and administrative error must never become a final denial of an eligible citizen's vote. Under this framework the franchise is uniform across the offices of each jurisdiction. The one proposal we hold that would alter that rule, age-matched federal suffrage, is set out separately in the Appendix, stated as a departure from this section, and would take effect only through an amendment to this section itself.

V. The Public Nominates; Parties Endorse

Political association is a freedom; political gatekeeping must not become a public entitlement. Citizens may establish parties, endorse candidates, raise lawful funds, and campaign together, and candidates may identify their affiliations openly or stand independently. Any eligible citizen may appear on the ballot for any office upon meeting uniform, publicly stated requirements of signatures, residency, and filing. Those requirements are set at the lowest level consistent with orderly administration, designed to demonstrate public support rather than to protect existing organizations, and identical for party-endorsed and independent candidates. No party may charge a fee, impose an additional petition, or exercise a veto over the appearance of any other candidate. Publicly administered preliminary elections, where retained, are open to every voter eligible for the office, and party membership is never a condition of taking part. Parties choose whom they endorse. Their endorsement does not determine who is permitted to compete.

VI. Representation Must Reach Beyond the Largest Local Bloc

Single-member, winner-take-all districts systematically silence dispersed minorities and turn many elections into formalities. A legislature should give substantial groups of voters a realistic opportunity to elect representatives who reflect their choices. Legislative bodies shall therefore be elected from multi-member districts by candidate-based single transferable vote. Voters rank individual candidates, and their preferences guide the allocation of seats without requiring acceptance of a party-controlled list. All seats within a multi-member district are elected together, since a system cannot claim proportional representation while electing every seat separately. The method is no experiment in this Commonwealth: Cambridge has elected its city council and school committee this way since 1941.

For Massachusetts, our preferred starting design is a 160-member House elected from 32 five-member districts for two-year terms, and a 40-member Senate elected from eight five-member districts for four-year terms, with four Senate districts electing in each biennial cycle so that half the Senate is renewed at every general election. This is a working architecture, not a promise of particular party totals. Final district magnitudes and boundaries follow public testing for population equality, geographic coherence, and racial and language-minority opportunity, together with legal review.

VII. Communities Must Remain Visible

Proportional representation must not erase geography. Districts respect the equal-population standard, municipal and county boundaries where practicable, and documented communities of interest. A community of interest is a population sharing concrete, documented ties—a watershed, a labor market, a transit corridor, a school system, shared public services, a common language—identified through an open public process before any map is drawn, never invented afterward to justify a preferred result. Party registration, voting history, and the residence of incumbents or prospective candidates never qualify. Electoral data may be used to detect exclusion and evaluate fairness, not to manufacture advantage, and no district is drawn to dilute or concentrate any racial, ethnic, or language minority beyond what equal protection and the opportunity to elect candidates of choice require. Proportionality and geographic coherence are simultaneous requirements; neither excuses disregard for equal political opportunity.

VIII. Authority Is Distributed Without Assigning Parties Their Turns

We reject mandatory party rotation and predetermined partisan ownership of offices. Voters may choose unified government or divided government, and no constitution should dictate that a party govern because its scheduled turn has arrived. Independently elected offices hold staggered terms and face voters on different cycles, and legislative districts renew in alternating classes, so that public authority does not depend entirely on a single election. Staggering does not guarantee political independence, and it is not meant to prevent a movement from winning broadly. Its purpose is continuity and recurring opportunities for correction. The deeper safeguard is that no electoral victory, however broad, transfers ownership of election rules, legal review, or public oversight.

IX. Executive Responsibilities Are Plural and Clear

Executive authority is divided where independent accountability serves a public purpose and coordinated where effective administration requires it. Independently elected officers—governor, attorney general, auditor, and such others as the people establish—hold clearly stated, non-overlapping domains, and areas requiring cooperation carry explicit procedures for resolving legal and administrative disputes. No officer may direct the removal of another or arbitrarily disable another's lawful function, and each is subject to the same disclosure and ethics rules. The chief executive retains the veto and the power to recommend; the legislature retains the power to override and to appropriate. The executive may not absorb legislative authority through emergency declarations or budgetary impasse, and the legislature may not use administrative obstruction to assume executive functions without constitutional authorization.

X. A Majority Must Be Able to Govern

Public institutions must be capable of passing laws, administering services, and responding to events. Ordinary legislation is decided by a majority, subject to constitutional rights and clearly defined checks, and procedural rules may not allow a small faction to bury proposals that a majority is prepared to debate and decide. The majority that organizes each chamber is determined by the members actually elected: no party is guaranteed leadership posts, committee chairs, or staff resources in advance of the election, committee membership fairly reflects the elected chamber, and committee jurisdictions and rules are adopted by each body after it is seated, with the previous body's rules carried forward only until the new body acts. Minority members retain meaningful access to information, questioning, deliberation, and recorded dissent. A majority must be able to act; a minority must remain able to organize, scrutinize, and become a majority.

XI. Public Process Makes Responsibility Visible

Cooperation cannot be commanded. Visibility can. Major proposals, negotiating positions, governing agreements, unresolved disputes, and final recorded votes are published on a timely basis, and budgets and major legislation follow defined procedures with time-limited negotiation periods. Public officials explain what they proposed, what they rejected, and what remains unresolved; they may not hide failure behind institutional complexity or claim credit while concealing responsibility. Legitimate protections for personal privacy and confidential legal advice remain, but they may not become blanket excuses for secret government. We do not require agreement on every question; we require an honest account of disagreement and a visible path to decision. Courts decide questions of law. They do not substitute their policy preferences for decisions entrusted to elected institutions.

XII. Essential Services Must Not Become Political Hostages

A missed budget deadline does not interrupt essential public operations. A narrowly defined continuation mechanism preserves previously authorized essential services while elected institutions complete the budget. Its scope, duration, treatment of revenue shortfalls, and reporting obligations are established in advance, it is subject to ordinary legal oversight, and it authorizes no new discretionary initiatives, no indefinite executive spending, and no permanent legislative avoidance. The public should not have to suffer an avoidable breakdown of essential services to discover which officials are willing to negotiate.

XIII. Political Money Is Visible

The public must be able to identify significant financial efforts to influence its choices. Contributions and election-related expenditures above a modest, inflation-adjusted threshold are disclosed in real time with the true identity of the source, and independent expenditures advocating the election or defeat of a candidate are disclosed on the same terms. Intermediaries may not be used to conceal control or evade reporting. Disclosure rules include narrowly defined protections for donors facing demonstrated threats or harassment, granted case by case and never as a general exemption. Public matching of small contributions is available on equal terms to every qualifying candidate, independent challengers included, who accepts the associated limits and reporting rules; acceptance is voluntary, and no public fund may be allocated according to prior electoral performance in a manner that rewards established organizations and excludes emerging ones. The purpose is not to silence speech but to let the public see who is trying to influence its choices.

XIV. Oversight Must Be Independent and Answerable

Election administration, boundary-setting, and public auditing must never be instruments of incumbent protection, and no party possesses a permanent entitlement to the machinery that governs how its opponents may compete. The bodies that perform these functions are appointed through multiple independent routes against qualifications and selection criteria published before any appointment is made, serve single non-renewable staggered terms, and operate under published conflict-of-interest rules. No permanent partisan balance is required. Their decisions are accompanied by public reasons and supporting data, subject only to legitimate privacy protections. A member may be removed only for defined misconduct, by a two-thirds vote of a reviewing body that does not include the officials whose elections the body supervises, and every removal is subject to judicial review. Their funding is set by a published formula and may not be reduced in response to unwelcome findings. Independence rests on institutional design and inspectable conduct, not on confidence that the right people will always be chosen.

XV. Every Election Must Be Verifiable

Counting rules are settled before the result is known. The law specifies the method of transferring surplus votes, the treatment of incomplete rankings, ties, recounts, certification, and challenges before any election is held under it, and deterministic fractional surplus transfer is the preferred method for its auditability. Elections preserve voter-verifiable records and permit independent checks of both recorded preferences and tabulation. Ranked ballots carry clear instructions and accessible formats. Voters may rank only the candidates they wish to support, and they are told in plain language that a ballot stops influencing later rounds once none of its ranked candidates remains available. Public confidence must rest on evidence citizens can examine, not assurances they are expected to accept.

XVI. Vacancies Must Respect the Original Mandate

Vacancy rules preserve both democratic authorization and continuity of service, and they are fixed before any vacancy occurs. In multi-member bodies elected proportionally, the first method is countback: the preceding election's ballots are recounted among the unelected candidates who remain eligible and confirm in writing that they are willing to serve. Because voters may have ranked a candidate partly for the organization that endorsed them, every candidate's current affiliation is published before the countback, and a candidate who has accepted the endorsement of a different organization since the election is excluded from it; candidates who stood as independents and remain so are unaffected. Where countback cannot produce a lawful successor, a special election fills the seat. Single-office vacancies follow succession rules appropriate to each office. No appointment fills an elected seat longer than the time required to conduct the countback or special election, and succession may never become a way to convert an elected position into a privately allocated reward.

XVII. Emergency Power Must Expire

Urgent circumstances may require extraordinary action. They do not transfer ownership of government to the executive. Emergency powers carry defined triggers, purposes, initial durations, and reporting obligations for every order and expenditure, and extension requires a recorded legislative vote. Legislative supervision and judicial review remain available throughout. No official may use emergency authority to extend their own tenure, cancel lawful replacement, or suspend the ordinary rules of succession, and temporary necessity may never become a permanent constitutional condition.

XVIII. One Framework at Every Scale

These principles apply wherever the public elects those who govern it, and the same test governs each level: can the public see the rules, contest the office, and replace the holder? Some rules hold at every scale without adjustment: contestability, open ballot access on equal terms, visible money, counting rules fixed before the count, independent and inspectable oversight, temporary emergency power, countback for vacancies, the uniform franchise within each jurisdiction, and public review after implementation. Others are sized to the electorate: the number of seats and district magnitude, term lengths and their stagger, signature requirements (a uniform share of the eligible electorate with a fixed cap, so they grow with population but never become prohibitive), disclosure thresholds (a share of the typical cost of a campaign at that level), and the size of the oversight body. Larger bodies use multi-member districts, small boards elect their members together by proportional vote, and single offices use the single-winner form of the same ranked count.

Level

Examples of elected bodies

How representation scales

Oversight

Local

Select boards, city councils, school committees

The whole municipality elects a multi-seat board by single transferable vote, as Cambridge does; single offices by ranked ballot

A shared state-chartered board serves small towns that cannot staff their own

Regional

County and regional school districts, councils of governments, watershed and water districts

Multi-member districts built from whole member towns, weighted by population

A regional board appointed through the member towns and the state body

Statewide

Legislature and independent executive officers

Multi-member STV districts on staggered cycles, as in Section VI

An independent state commission under Section XIV

Federal

House, Senate, President

House delegations from multi-member STV districts; Senate seats staggered as now; single-seat offices by ranked ballot

A national commission for federal contests, without displacing state administration

Multi-member House districts require Congress to repeal the 1967 statute mandating single-member districts; no constitutional amendment is needed for that step. The Senate is a different matter. Equal representation of the states, regardless of population, is guaranteed by Article V and cannot be altered without each affected state's consent. Ranked ballots and staggered terms improve how senators are chosen within each state, but they do not make the Senate consistent with Section VI, and we do not claim otherwise. Each level adopts these rules through its own charter, constitution, or statute, and no higher level may use them to dissolve the authority of a lower one. Small jurisdictions may share administrative and oversight resources rather than build burdensome institutions of their own, and existing forms of direct participation are respected: a town keeps its town meeting, and the framework governs the boards it elects, not the assembly through which its people legislate directly.

XIX. Transition Must Be Orderly and Public

Reform proceeds through public proposals, understandable rules, lawful adoption, and a published transition. Its principles must be clear enough for citizens to judge without mastering every administrative detail, and its technical rules precise enough for officials to implement without inventing policy after adoption. Existing officeholders complete the terms to which they were elected. Initial election classes, new boundaries, administrative preparation, and effective dates are established and published before implementation, and the first elections under the new rules occur on the regular schedule for each office. District maps for the initial multi-member elections are drawn by the independent body under the new criteria and used only after public notice and a period for challenge. No incumbent is entitled to a protected district, a reserved ballot position, or a favorable pairing. Closely dependent provisions take effect together, and separable reforms are not held hostage to unrelated measures. The transition ends when every office has been filled under the new rules at least once. Throughout, reform belongs to the public; it must not become the private project of another self-appointed governing class.

XX. The System Must Remain Correctable

We demand accountability from existing institutions and accept the same demand for the institutions we propose. Constitutional principles should be durable, but administrative machinery must remain capable of improvement, and operational details are not frozen into constitutional text without need. After implementation, independent public assessments examine representation, accessibility, reliability, cost, opportunities for challenge, governmental performance, and unintended effects. Their assumptions, methods, and findings are published, unfavorable findings are never concealed, and recommendations return to the ordinary processes of legislation and amendment. No reform is entitled to immunity from the accountability it demands of every other institution.

XXI. Amendment Remains with the People

This framework may be altered only by the processes the people establish for constitutional amendment: proposal by a supermajority of both legislative chambers or by petition of a substantial portion of the eligible electorate, followed in either case by ratification by the people. No legislature, court, or executive may revise the core rules of contestability, proportionality, the uniform adult franchise, or independent oversight by ordinary statute or procedural maneuver. The people who adopt the system retain the power to change it.

Our Declaration

We reject government by inherited entitlement, institutional enclosure, and permanent political possession. We affirm the freedom to organize, the opportunity to compete, equal adult citizenship, the responsibility of public service, and the authority of the public to replace its representatives. We do not claim that constitutional design can eliminate disagreement, ambition, or error; we demand institutions that make power answerable despite them. The work of drafting the precise constitutional text, the maps, the counting statutes, and the transition rules remains. The direction does not. We seek a government strong enough to act, transparent enough to examine, distributed enough to resist capture, and accountable enough to correct.

No party owns the government. No officeholder owns an office. No reformer owns the truth. Public power must remain a public trust, and public choice must remain real.

Appendix: Age-Matched Suffrage, a Freestanding Proposal

This proposal is inconsistent with Section IV, which guarantees every adult citizen a uniform vote for every office, and with Section XXI, which protects that guarantee as a core rule. It is offered in keeping with Section I: we hold it, we state plainly where it conflicts with our own principles, and we set it apart for separate judgment. It would take effect only by amending Sections IV and XXI through the procedures of Section XXI and, for federal offices, by an amendment to the United States Constitution superseding the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the vote to citizens eighteen and older. Nothing else in the framework depends on it.

The proposal is that the minimum age to vote for an office equal the minimum age to hold it, applied uniformly at each level of government without exception for military service, taxpaying status, or any other claim. Where an office's minimum age is eighteen, as it is for most local and many state offices, the rule changes nothing. Its effect falls chiefly on the highest federal offices, and each level of government would decide for itself whether to adopt it.

Federal office

Minimum candidate age

Proposed minimum voter age

House of Representatives

25

25

Senate

30

30

President

35

35

The case for it is that the Constitution already treats accumulated years as relevant to the exercise of federal power, and that choosing who will wield that power is itself a share in it. Age is public, verifiable, and non-ideological; it examines no one's beliefs, education, wealth, or standing, and the same line would bind the person who holds the office and the people who choose the holder. On this view, the gravity of an office is a reason for a higher threshold at both ends of the transaction.

The case against it comes from this manifesto's own first principles. A voter-age limit is not the mirror image of a candidate-age limit: one restricts who may hold power, the other restricts who may hold power accountable and replace it. Removing citizens between eighteen and thirty-four from presidential elections would hand the selection of the national executive to a narrower electorate on questions of debt, climate, housing, and war whose consequences fall longest on the people excluded. Any advocate of this proposal must answer that objection directly before it can be reconciled with the rule that no group may convert its position into privileged control over who chooses.